

DOM-based XSS Filter through Browser Extensions

CS5231 Project Report

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1. **Introduction**
2. **Definition of DOM-based XSS**

The main difference of DOM-based XSS compared to other XSS vulnerabilities such as reflected and stored XSS is that DOM-based XSS attack doesn't have to send any data at all towards the server. The attack happens entirely within the browser as opposed to be dependent on the response from the server.

The response from the server doesn’t have to contain any malicious code in order for DOM-based XSS to succeed. The response page only has to access data that is unsafe in order for the attack to succeed. Examples of the unsafe data that can be accessed from a non-malicious page are document.location or document.URL or document.referrer.

1. **Example**

We can easily craft a very simple HTML page with DOM-based XSS vulnerability as follows:

<html><head><title>Test Page</title></head>  
 <body>  
 <script>  
 document.write("Site is at: " + document.location.href + ".");  
 </script>  
 </body>  
</html>

If this page is hosted on:

http://localhost/xss.html

Then we can simply open the page and launch the attack with the following URL:

http://localhost/xss.html#<script>alert('xss')</script>

Since the vulnerability is injected through the fragment part of the URL, it happens entirely inside the browser.

1. **Studies From Other Filters**
2. **XSSAuditor, noXSS, IE8 Filter**

In order to design and implement our own filter, some basic knowledge needs to be obtained from the current implementations. We find several implementations, such as noXSS, IE8 Filter and XSSAuditor. However, noXSS has stopped being updated since 2008 and only supports very old version of Firefox and furthermore there is no source code available; IE8 Filter never published any useful information. Only XSSAuditor is still being updated and it’s built into the Chrome browser. Therefore, we decided to focus on XSSAuditor.

XSSAuditor is a filter which is highly integrated into Chrome. XSSAuditor is in the pipline of displaying a web page in Chrome. After receiving a web page from the server, Chrome starts to parse the web page information, and construct a structure of the web page. When the parsing is finished by the browser, XSSAuditor jumps in and try to find out whether there are some XSS attacks in the webpage or not. Then the last step is Chrome continues with the rendering process. We can see XSSAuditor uses the pipeline of the Chrome browser, unlike other filters such as noXSS which needs a separate parser to parse the page first.

The advantage is that the filter uses the data parsed by the browser itself, so there are no inconsistency between the page seen by the filter and the page seen by the browser. The additional parser by filters will also slow down the rendering process, because the web pages are parsed twice: the first time is by the parser from filters, the second time is by the parser from the browser itself.

More importantly, we also learn some implementation details from XSSAuditor and other filters:

* 1. <base> element is very dangerous. By injecting it (or altering the href attribute of an existing <base>), an attacker can cause the browser to external scripts from the attacker’s server if the scripts are designated with relative URLs. The attacker only needs to do one attack to change the base URL, and then the user will simply go to attacker’s website. So the filter should block the request which has <base> URL information in it.
  2. Before the filter tries to find the XSS script from the web page, the web page information needs to be decoded. (e.g. replace %41 with A; replace &amp; with &) Otherwise, the attacker may use the encoding mechanism to bypass the filter. For example, an attacker can bypass the IE8 filter by encoding the injected content in the UTF-7 character set, which is not decoded by the IE8 filter regular expressions.
  3. We cannot just simply match the block

<script>…</script>

because the attaker may not need the </script> tag to do the attack. The example is, in the original website, the code looks like:

<?php echo $GET[“q”]; ?><script>/…/…</script>

If the attacker injects code

<script>XSSAttack /

into the page, the page will become:

<script>XSSAttack /…/…</script>

In this case, the code block

<script>…/

can attack already. Instead of attempting to find the entire script in the request, we can try to find some patterns. We can learn some patterns from other filters, such as:

* <script>(.?)</script>
* src[\r\n]=[\r\n]\\\'(.?)\\\'
* document.

After these patterns are found in request, the request needs to be blocked.

* 1. If the string or a substring of a string is in both the request and the response, this request normally contains a reflective XSS attack and the filter needs to block it. For example, in the request, the attacker sends:

http://localhost/page.html?default=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>

The script part will be also inside the response from the server.

* 1. The filter should apply to the DOM tree created by the parser, because if we apply the filter to the bytes that comprise the response, it may not be as clear as we exam the DOM tree. DOM tree is more structured, and the information in the DOM tree is more accurate. For example, for the web page uses document.write(), examining the bytes may not find the XSS attack. However, examining DOM tree will get it.

1. **Firefox NoScript and Chrome NotScripts**

We have also taken a look at plugins which, by default, block all scripts from executing until they are specifically enabled by the user. With these plugins, users will have to add the Javascript which is allowed to be executed one-by-one to the whitelist. The granularity of each entry in the whitelist is the domain name of the servers hosting the Javascript scripts.

While this may initially sound like a good idea for security, this causes a lot of trouble to users to add the scripts from their favorite websites to the whitelist one-by-one. However, other than that, there are several problems with this approach:

1. A script which is known to users doesn't necessarily mean the script can be safely executed in all cases.
2. A script which is safe to execute today may not be necessarily safe again tomorrow.
3. Because of the granularity of the whitelist entry, if a user wants to enable only one certain script from a domain name, the user will accidentally enable all scripts from the same domain name. Out of the many scripts hosted on the same domain, several scripts may not be safe to execute.
4. **Browser**
5. **Selection**

We have chosen to implement our own plugin on Google Chrome browser. The reason for choosing this browser is because we are able to temporarily disable Google Chrome's anti-XSS protection (XSSAuditor) by using the command:

chrome.exe --args --disable-xss-auditor

This is a very important feature to test our plugin. If the XSSAuditor is enabled, we will not know which of XSSAuditor and our plugin is responsible for blocking the script.

Disabling anti-XSS protection is, as far as we know, not possible in Mozilla Firefox.

1. **Features**

Chrome has the chrome.webRequest API which allows extensions to intercept the web request at various points in its life cycle. We can then analyze the content of request at the interception to eliminate the attack vectors. Our proposed solution is to intercept the request when it is about to be sent, or to intercept the response when it is about to be received. We are still in the progress of finding out the point that we shall intercept.

1. **Approach**
2. **Idea**

We have identified several possible sources of DOM-based XSS, namely:

* HTTP referrer
* URL of the page
* Window name

If any of these possible sources are used by the legitimate Javascript of the page without sanitization, then there is risk of DOM-based XSS. For HTTP referrer, the only way to access it is through document.referrer. As for window name, the only way to access it is through window.name. However, there are many possible ways to access the URL (or parts of it) of the page from the Javascript. We list the possible ways below:

* document.URL
* document.documentURI
* document.location
* window.location

This list may look short; however document.location and window.location have many properties which can access the URL (or parts of it). We list down the properties below. An example is also given to demonstrate which part of URL each of these properties return. This list and example is taken from https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/DOM/window.location.

Example URL: http://www.example.com:8080/search?q=devmo#test

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Property** | **Example** |
| hash | #test |
| host | www.example.com:8080 |
| hostname | www.example.com |
| href | http://www.example.com:8080/search?q=devmo#test |
| origin | http://www.example.com:8080 |
| pathname | /search |
| port | 8080 |
| protocol | http: |
| search | ?q=devmo |

For all these properties of location, we can separate those that are harmless and harmful as follows:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Harmless** | **Harmful** |
| host | hash |
| hostname | href |
| origin | pathname |
| port | search |
| protocol |  |

The reason that some of these properties are considered harmless is that if the value of those properties is set to contain malicious script, then the website visited will be totally different from initial website, making the exploit on a website fails because the user will end up in some other website.

For those considered harmful, it is because if the value is set to contain a malicious script, the user will still end up in the same page. The only exception to this is pathname, which can make user visit other page on the same website. We still consider this harmful because if the other page accesses the pathname, the attack can go through. One example is if the URL is set by an attacker as follows: http://www.example.com:8080/<script>alert(1)</script>. This pathname will very likely be not found in any website, however, if the 404 (or other error) page of any website accesses the pathname, then the attack can still work.

1. **Implementation**

LALALALALALA

location.pathname and location.search already encoded by Chrome, but not others so override……………………………

1. **Result**
2. **Test cases**

We have chosen to implement our own plugin on Google Chrome browser. The reason for choosing this browser is because we are able to temporarily disable Google Chrome's anti-XSS protection (XSSAuditor) by using the command:

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Disabling anti-XSS protection is, as far as we know, not possible in Mozilla Firefox.

1. **Screenshots**

Chrome has the chrome.webRequest API which allows extensions to intercept the web request at various points in its life cycle. We can then analyze the content of request at the interception to eliminate the attack vectors. Our proposed solution is to intercept the request when it is about to be sent, or to intercept the response when it is about to be received. We are still in the progress of finding out the point that we shall intercept.

1. **Discussion**
2. **What other filters can do**

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1. **Pros and cons**

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1. **Future Work**
2. **aaaa**

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1. **bbbbb**

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1. **Other Findings**
2. **Override-ability of Javascript Object Attribute**

In this section, we will give the result of our investigation on why some attributes such as document.location.href cannot be overridden.

First, let’s take a look at a Javascript object. Each Javascript object has properties. Each property consists of a name and a value. The name can be any string while the value can be any Javascript value. Each property has property attributes. These property attributes specify whether the associated property is can be written, enumerated and configured. These property attributes are respectively called *writable*, *enumerable* and *configurable*. The value of these property attributes is simply a Boolean.

We can easily examine the value of these property attributes of a Javascript object by simply using the following line of code on the Javascript console of Google Chrome. We also provide several examples of usage.

Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(obj, “attrName”);

// Examples:

Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(window, “location”);

Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(document.location, “href”);

Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(document.location, “hash”);

For the purpose of our filter, we are especially interested with the *configurable* property. If the *configurable* attribute of an object attribute is *false*, the getter and setter cannot be changed. If the *configurable* property of an attribute is initially *true*, then it is possible to change it to *false*. However, if a *configurable* property of an attribute is initially *false*, then it is impossible to change it to *true*.

In the table below, we summarize the property attributes of several DOM attributes in Google Chrome 27 which we are interested in overriding:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DOM Attribute** | **writable** | **enumerable** | **configurable** |
| document.referrer | True | True | True |
| document.URL | True | True | True |
| document.documentURI | True | True | True |
| document.location | True | True | True |
| document.location.href | True | True | False |
| document.location.hash | True | True | True |
| window.name | True | True | True |
| window.location | True | True | False |
| window.location.href | True | True | False |
| window.location.hash | True | True | True |
| HERY: Do I miss anything? |  |  |  |

Now we can see clearly why we are not able to override the getter function of document.location.href but is able to deal with it by overriding document.location instead. It is because the *configurable* attribute of document.location.href is *false* while the *configurable* attribute for document.location is *true*.

We can also see why we have no choice but to forcefully encode the value of window.location.hash to protect window.location and window.location.href instead of using a gentler way of overriding the getter function only. It is because the *configurable* attribute for both window.location and window.location.href is *false*. Luckily, the *writable* attribute of window.location.hash is *true*, so there is still at least some protection by forcefully encoding the value.

Now, knowing the nature of property attributes and the value of the *configurable* attribute of these properties, we can make our filter even better by setting the *configurable* attribute to *false* after we override the getter function. This will make attacks that exploit the override-ability of these properties fail. The code snippet to do that is as follows:

Object.defineProperty(obj, “attrName”, {configurable: false});

// Examples:

Object.defineProperty(document, “URL”, {configurable: false});

Object.defineProperty(window, “name”, {configurable: false});

Object.defineProperty(document.location, “hash”, {configurable: false});

**Reference**

noXSS <http://www.noxss.org>  
 <https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/noxss>

OWASP <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-site_Scripting_(XSS)>  
<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/DOM_Based_XSS>  
<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/DOM_based_XSS_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet>

NoScript <http://noscript.net>